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FAIRNESS IN ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING:
TRADE-OFFS, POLICY CHOICES, AND
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
ADAM HARKENS
Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham
Abstract
This article discusses conceptions of fairness in algorithmic
decision-making, within the context of the UK’s legal system.
Using practical operational examples of algorithmic tools, it
argues that such practices involve inherent technical trade-offs
over multiple, competing notions of fairness, which are further
exacerbated by policy choices made by those public authorities
who use them. This raises major concerns regarding the ability
of such choices to affect legal issues in decision-making, and
transform legal protections, without adequate legal oversight,
or a clear legal framework. This is not to say that the law does
not have the capacity to regulate and ensure fairness, but that
a more expansive idea of its function is required.
Keywords: algorithmic decision-making, machine learning,
fairness, criminal justice, administrative law
[A] INTRODUCTION
In June 2019, the Law Society of England and Wales launched a report
on the use of algorithms in the criminal justice system of England and
Wales, examining current and potential use cases in the United Kingdom,
as well as related legal challenges and consequences (Law Society 2019).
The report raised a number of concerns related to algorithmic decision-
making, including the potential to produce biased and discriminatory
decisions, the oversimplification of complex issues because of the methods
of quantification employed, the loss of autonomy for those individuals who
must enter the processes of the legal system and be decided about, a lack
of transparency as to the reasons why a particular decision has been
made, and the hindering of legal scrutiny of decisions, among others. 
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What each of these concerns share is a general common theme related
to questions of fairness and justice in the legal system. Were any of these
concerns to be realised in an operational algorithmic (or part-algorithmic)
decision-making process, this would hinder the quality of justice being
provided and ultimately undermine trust in the protections and capacities
of the English legal system. This in itself is concerning because it
demonstrates how each design question—whether minor or not—in the
construction of an algorithmic decision-making process, is fraught with
danger and can have significant consequences for the perception and
practices of the wider legal system. This involves more than explicit
technical design decisions and trade-offs, however, and any effort to
analyse these tools should also incorporate the policy choices of public
authorities which choose to incorporate them into decision-making
processes.
This article aims at beginning to explore these design questions,
including how they are made and how they are justified, in order to ask
how they may affect the function of the legal system, and whether they
can transform longstanding principles and concepts of legal protection in
England and Wales, including procedural rights. It does so firstly by
briefly discussing the context of algorithmic decision-making in the UK,
before moving on to discuss technical trade-offs around fairness, inherent
to machine learning and algorithmic tools. Next, it contextualises these
trade-offs within the context of public policy and operational decisions
made by public authorities, before finally analysing how this may affect
and transform procedural rights in the English legal system, where the
majority of clearly applicable current protections focus on issues relating
to data protection.
[B] PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND ALGORITHMIC
DECISIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Algorithmic decision-making is most notably being used in two specific
areas of the English legal system: to automate, supplement and support
administrative decision-making at the national and local council level; and
to do the same for criminal justice in the context of resource management,
surveillance, and risk assessment for policing, as well as more general
offender management at varying post-arrest and pre-trial stages.
Algorithmic decision-making for the purposes of immigration management
spans both areas, depending on the type of decision being made.
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Administrative Use
The types of administrative decision which have been targeted for
automation include those relating to welfare and tax, immigration and
residence checks, and social care. The extent to which these programmes
have been developed and implemented varies, with some remaining in
pilot status, while others have been fully implemented. For example, at
the national level, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) have both attempted to improve
‘service delivery’ through the automation of decision-making processes.
Through the ‘Making Tax Digital’ programme, and the ‘Connect’ database,
HMRC intends to have fully digitalised services in the UK through the
integration of real-time data streams to correct tax-code errors,
automatically provide tax rebates, ensure debt collection, and to increase
fraud detection capacities (Government Digital Service 2017).
The DWP, building on HMRC’s real-time system, has been making use
of available data to automatically assess individual Universal Credit
claims, and to detect and pursue fraud (Government Digital Service 2017).
This information is also central to the European Union EU settlement
scheme, where EU citizens and their families must apply for ‘settled
status’ following the UK’s exit from the European Union. A system of
initially automated checks makes the decision as to whether these citizens
receive ‘indefinite leave to remain’ (settled status), ‘limited leave to remain’
(pre-settled status)—lasting for a period of five years—or are rejected and
must provide further evidence to a human caseworker (Tomlinson 2019).1
Simultaneously, local councils in England have begun to make use of
algorithmic modelling for the purposes of predicting risk and the need for
interventions in the home care of children. These are all separate systems,
developed in-house and by private companies, and are not part of a wider
policy (Dencik and Others 2018).
The Criminal Justice System
The picture in the criminal justice system is largely similar, in that current
projects are still in development, and many make use of the same style of
algorithmic modelling and risk prediction. However, algorithmic tools are
also being used in the criminal justice system to enable other kinds of
technologies, including live facial recognition and hotspot mapping.
For example, Durham Constabulary’s Harm Assessment Risk Tool
(HART) is designed to aid the decision-making of a custody officer
1 EU Settlement Scheme guidance booklets for caseworkers.
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immediately following the arrest of an individual within County Durham.
If a charge is to be brought forward, the custody officer on duty is required
to decide whether to ‘bail (conditionally or unconditionally), hold in
custody, prosecute, or divert [the suspect] from the Criminal Justice
System (CJS) with an out of court disposal’ and HART helps in doing so
by sorting said suspects into three risk groups: high, medium and low
(Urwin 2016).
A similar system is being developed by West Midland’s Police—the ‘Data
Driven Insights’ Programme (DDI)—alternatively attempts to identify high-
risk individuals for intervention before they have committed any crimes
(Alan Turing Institute and Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing
2017). West Midlands Police are also helping to develop the National Data
Analytics Solution (NDAS), which is using algorithmic technologies with
the goal of moving law enforcement ‘away from its traditional crime related
role and into wider and deeper aspects of social and public policy’ by
facilitating interventions for individuals at risk of harm (Alan Turing
Institute and Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing 2017: 3).
London Metropolitan Police’s Gangs Matrix is currently used to identify
individuals who are members of a ‘gang’, at risk of becoming recruited as
a gang member, or at risk of becoming a victim of gang violence. This is
achieved through data analysis, which gives individuals a ‘gang score’
based upon their activities, interests and friendship groups (ICO 2018).
London Metropolitan Police are also responsible for trialling Live Facial
Recognition (LFR) systems within the capital and have come under
significant scrutiny alongside South Wales Police for similar practices
(Fussey and Murray 2019).
[C] TRADE-OFFS IN MACHINE LEARNING
A substantial body of literature exists on the ways in which fairness is
defined, redefined, and operationalized within machine-learning systems;
so much so that it would be beyond the scope of this article to cover
sufficiently and in full detail. What is important for this article to
acknowledge though is that within this literature there is a general
recognition of the existence and requirement of trade-offs when defining
fairness because of the limitations of algorithmic analysis (Berk and
Others 2017).
One operational algorithmic decision-making in the United States,
COMPAS, has received significant public attention because of these very
issues. In 2016, journalists from ProPublica took a sample of 11,757
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people that had been processed through the COMPAS system in Broward
County, Florida, between 2013 and 2014. Their COMPAS scores were
then compared with the county’s records and analysed for their accuracy
in predicting actual recidivism rates within two years of the initial risk
assessment. The two-year standard is used by Northpointe, the
developers, for its own validation studies (Northpointe 2015).
Following the study, ProPublica concluded that black defendants were
77% more likely to be classified as higher risk (medium to high), compared
to white defendants, for violent recidivism risk, and 63% more likely for
general recidivism risk. This discrepancy remains when looking at
‘misclassifications’ or errors in risk calculation. Here, black defendants
who did not commit crimes within the next two years were almost twice
as likely to be misclassified as higher risk (45% compared with 23% of
white defendants), and white defendants who did commit crimes within
the next two years were almost twice as likely to be labelled low risk (48%
compared with 28% of black defendants). Figure 1 shows a visualization
of the risk scores in this sample, including the more even distribution of
scores for black defendants, contrasted with the low-risk heavy bars for
white scores (Angwin and Others 2016a).
Later in the same year, COMPAS developers responded with a validity
study claiming ‘predictive parity’ between black and white defendants in
Broward County. The main counterpoint to ProPublica’s findings, they
argue, is that by splitting defendants into separate groupings of black and
white, and therefore analysing the accuracy of this tool on a different
basis, this shifted white defendants to a lower base risk ‘relative to the
norm’ (Dieterich and Others 2016: 4-5).
Northpointe entirely rejected any accusations of bias by stating this
information ‘does not show evidence of bias, but rather is a natural
consequence of using unbiased scoring rules for groups that happen to
have different distributions of scores’ (Dieterich and Others 2016: 8;
original emphasis). ‘Natural consequence’ is used here because it is the
algorithms within COMPAS that attempt to roughly split up the norming
group into ten ‘decile scores’ of risk, from one to ten (Northpointe 2015:
8). The company makes the argument that once fed back into the system
as a single grouping, the risk scores of white defendants will demonstrate
a more even distribution.
While this is statistically justified, ProPublica still made the case that
‘when you compare black and white defendants with similar
characteristics, black defendants tend to get higher scores’, which would
suggest that the COMPAS algorithm could be setting in stone systematic
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racial basis, already pre-existing within the Broward County criminal
justice system (Angwin and Others 2016b). While COMPAS developers
were making an argument of statistical fairness, ProPublica’s represents
one of political and legal fairness. Incorporating the two into one system
is no mean feat. Often, constructing a ‘fair’ system requires decisions to
be made regarding competing notions of fairness which are potentially
incompatible.
Figure 1: Distribution of risk by race in ProPublica’s validation study of
COMPAS. Source: Angwin and Others 2016a.
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[D] THE COMPLEXITY AND CONSEQUENCES
OF POLICY CHOICES
Harm Assessment Risk Tool
In the UK, similar trade-offs have been made which go beyond specific
technical concerns, incorporating, and being justified by, public policy
decisions. The best example of this is Durham Constabulary’s HART.
Because in the belief that ‘not all errors are equal’, HART is designed to
be overly cautious and prioritise false positives over false negatives (Urwin
2016: 53, 75). In practice, this means that, if a decision between two risk
groups is borderline, HART’s algorithms are designed to predict a higher
level of risk for the given individual. This is done in order to avoid the
most dangerous errors, which would be when a person is classified as low
risk, but goes on to commit a serious offence and therefore actually
represented high risk to the community. Similar design choices may have
been made with COMPAS, but this cannot be said with any certainty as
the tool is proprietary, and available literature does not discuss choices
like this (Brennan and Dieterich 2018). 
The crucial point here is that these choices of what is considered ‘fair’
and ‘safe’ have been designed into the tool. While there is a level of
complexity in terms of how the algorithms analyse available data itself,
there is also a level of control available to policymakers as to what
direction the analysis should take and how individuals are treated. In this
situation, the decision has been made to treat potentially innocent
individuals more harshly, on the basis of an algorithmic prediction. 
HART in contrast uses 34 risk predictors—taking information on the
defendant at time of arrest and combining this with Durham
Constabulary’s pre-existing records. The majority of these relate to the
individual’s criminal history, along with age, gender, two forms of
postcode data, and the number of police intelligence reports collected on
that person, for example (Oswald and Others 2018). The data from these
parameters is combined to construct 509 different decision trees,
including ‘classification’ and ‘regression’ trees, or CARTs (Oswald and
Others 2018). Each of these ‘trees’ essentially represents a separate
algorithm that analyses a random sample, or ‘case profile’ of an
individual’s data to categorize (classification) and make predictions
(regression). 
When each decision tree is completed and has come to a conclusion on
how risky someone is, the tool draws from the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ by
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combining the trees, so that each one casts a ‘vote’ on whether the person
at hand is low risk, medium risk, or high risk (Gollapudi 2016). Through
an example of this voting process, it is possible to see how borderline
decisions are treated. Figure 2 demonstrates a number of test case studies
(see Urwin 2016). Case studies 5 and 6 are both borderline examples. In
either of these, the individual in question could be either high or moderate
risk. Moderate risk would enable them to be processed through an ‘out-
of-court disposal’, however, in this example, the individual was required
to continue through the courts process, along with the more extensive
socio-legal consequences that this would cause.
Other Tools
As with HART, operational choices and non-technical definitions are
crucial in other examples of decision-making systems, including the Gangs
Matrix. For example, the following questions must be decided before a tool
like this could be used: what level of association does one need to have in
order to be considered a gang member? And how is the meaning of gang
defined in this instance? A recent enforcement notice from the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) demonstrates this exact problem. This showed
that victims of gang crime were often assigned a risk score and included
within the main database of the matrix itself as a potential risk, either
because of the belief that this demonstrated gang associations, or it was
registered as part of their crime history (ICO 2018: 9-11). 
Figure 2: Case Study of ‘majority voting’ in HART. Source: Unwin 2016:
10 (Fig 10).
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Concerns have also been raised regarding the NDAS and one of its
designated purposes and justifications being to reduce ‘harm’ (West
Midlands Police 2019). Harm is not defined in this situation, yet the
different ways this term can be used could have a significant impact both
on the decision being made and the capacities of the machine learning
involved. This is particularly the case given West Midlands Police’s
determination to move into areas of ‘social and public policy’, beyond
traditional policing, and thus expanding their powers of intervention.
These are certainly questions about fairness because they clearly
impact upon the types of decision being made, as well as the treatment
which an individual will receive as they are faced with various arms of the
legal system. They are not technical issues—in that they are not questions
surrounding the efficacy or efficiency of the algorithmic tools—yet they
add layers of complexity through their interaction with technical choices
that must be made during the design process, and can change the
technical parameters of a decision based on how a given term is defined.
Ensuring fairness therefore, requires more than an analysis of the ways
in which the machine-learning model of a particular tool produces a risk
score, but must also incorporate how this is interpreted by the public
authority, how this authority has influenced the design process, how it
has decided to make the decision-making system operational, and how
its use has been justified, both legally, and in the language of ‘social and
public policy’.
[E] PROCEDURAL CONFLICTS
Much has been spoken so far regarding the types of technical and policy
choices and trade-offs that must be made during the design process of
an algorithmic decision-making tool and which affect fairness in the
legal system, but less attention has been paid towards a crucial aspect
of this: the law. Depending on how algorithmic decision-making is
implemented, these tools sit at an important intersection of a number
of different bodies of law. 
As a result, legal frameworks from administrative law, data protection
law, criminal law and criminal justice can all have an effect on how these
systems are treated legally, and on their legality more crucially and
generally. Much work has already been carried out from the perspective
of data protection, particularly related to automated decision-making and
concepts such as the right to an explanation.2 Administrative law is also
2 See, for example, among many others: Edwards and Veale (2018).
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becoming a focus for this area, with research beginning to tackle
algorithmic decision-making more seriously, using traditional concepts
and principles (Oswald 2018; Cobbe 2019). This is the case for human
rights law too, including international human rights law frameworks
(McGregor and Others 2019). Much less has been written regarding the
perspective of criminal law and criminal justice in the UK, though at least
one project is working on this specific issue at the moment (Yeung 2019).
Tackling algorithmic decision-making, and analysing it through the
perspective of each of these strands of law, is certainly crucial. This
provides insights as to how traditional legal principles can be affected by
this style of decision-making. Currently, the lack of combined and
targeted legal frameworks (outside of the UK Data Protection Act 2018
and associated Data Protection Impact Assessments), means that the
actions of public authorities in designing and implementing algorithmic
tools are ensuring that it is largely public policy which is dictating what
can be considered ‘fair’ in these circumstances, including the work of
government bodies like the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. 
This leaves questions over fairness in somewhat of a legal vacuum—in
that the legal basis for these technologies has not been adequately
identified or confirmed (Fussey and Murray 2019) when it should be the
law which is primarily defining and protecting this concept. Data
protection plays an important role in attempting to prevent such
developments, as seen above in relation to the Gangs Matrix inclusion of
victim’s data and associate implications. However, this was primarily
raised as a data retention issue, and one regarding the fair processing of
data, rather than the specific question of what can be considered to be a
fair decision (ICO 2018: 9-11). 
To conceive of what is legally fair in this situation, requires an
understanding of how legal concepts are affected, such as discretion, the
duty to provide reasons, the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial—
which are brought into question by the relative lack of transparency in
the tools involved, as well as their predictive capabilities, and the ways in
which they may constrain human decision-makers. This means that they
are not approached simply from the perspective of the ‘rules’ of each
individual legal area, but considered through the frame of fairness for the
entire legal system as a whole. Given that these are legal concepts, they
should also only change through legal methods, whether through the
courts or legislation. Allowing such concepts to be transformed through
policy actions may produce unwelcome shifts, without due care.
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To achieve this, we must consider the design of the decision-making
process from beginning to end and understand where trade-offs exist,
where policy choices can apply, and decisions must be made as to how to
secure a clear legal basis for algorithmic decision-making, where it is
central to high stakes tasks. The creation of algorithmic decision-making
tools is ultimately an extremely flexible process, as even where the
limitations of machine learning have been reached in a given situation,
further non-technical choices can be made which increase technical and
legal complexity.
[F] CONCLUSION
Algorithmic decision-making is becoming more widespread in the United
Kingdom, affecting an increasing number of procedures of the English
system, including risk assessment by law enforcement for targeted
intervention in crime prevention, the management of individual
defendants, and the identification of potential offenders. It is also
becoming important for administrative procedures, such as its central
role in the EU Settlement Scheme. 
This article has demonstrated that the design of these algorithmic tools
involves a number of technical trade-offs and policy choices that can have
a severe effect on the form of ‘fairness’ which a given tool can provide.
These must be considered as being on a par, as their combination
produces further complexity within the legal system and its associated
procedures. Further, it has argued that these choices and trade-offs
potentially result in legal fairness being treated as a public policy, where
these tools exist within a certain degree of a legal vacuum. This should
be prevented, and it should be the structures of the law which set out and
define the kinds of choices that can be legally made in this area and which
are legally fair. For example, decisions such as whether it is fair to treat
an individual more harshly, based on a higher risk score which may be a
false positive, should only be decided through the perspective of the law.
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